A formless state, either a meditative state or its resultant realm of existence, i.e., a class of deities of the formless realm.
A formless state, either a meditative state or its resultant realm of existence, i.e., a class of deities of the formless realm.
Teacher, sometimes more specifically the deputy or substitute of the upādhyāya.
The essentially pure nature of mind is obscured and afflicted by various psychological defilements, which destroy the mind’s peace and composure and lead to unwholesome deeds of body, speech, and mind, acting as causes for continued existence in saṃsāra. Included among them are the primary afflictions of desire (rāga), anger (dveṣa), and ignorance (moha). It is said that there are eighty-four thousand of these negative mental qualities, for which the eighty-four thousand categories of the Buddha’s teachings serve as the antidote.
Kleśa is also commonly translated as “negative emotions,” “disturbing emotions,” and so on. The Pāli kilesa, Middle Indic kileśa, and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit kleśa all primarily mean “stain” or “defilement.” The translation “affliction” is a secondary development that derives from the more general (non-Buddhist) classical understanding of √kliś (“to harm,“ “to afflict”). Both meanings are noted by Buddhist commentators.
A mental factor understood either as “the subtlety of the mind” or as the cause for such subtlety. More elaborate definitions explain it as a type of “mental murmur” (manojalpa) that is searching (paryeṣaka) and can be either based on intention (cetanā) or on wisdom (prajñā). See also “deliberation” (vitarka).
According to Buddhist tradition, one who is worthy of worship (pūjām arhati), or one who has conquered the enemies, the mental afflictions (kleśa-ari-hata-vat), and reached liberation from the cycle of rebirth and suffering. It is the fourth and highest of the four fruits attainable by śrāvakas. Also used as an epithet of the Buddha.
Yathā means “in accordance”/“just as,” and bhūta is a participle from the root bhū, which can mean “to exist” or “to come into existence.” The term yathābhūta is a key term in Buddhist texts, indicating the way things are, the nature of things, etc. It is usually used adverbially, indicating the way in which someone cognizes.
In its broadest sense, the term saṁskāra includes all impermanent entities when understood as causes. The prefix sam is here understood as indicating “coming together” or “assembling,” while the root kṛ means “to produce,” “to create.”
A type of nonhuman being whose precise status is subject to different views, but is included as one of the six classes of beings in the sixfold classification of realms of rebirth. In the Buddhist context, asuras are powerful beings said to be dominated by envy, ambition, and hostility. They are also known in the pre-Buddhist and pre-Vedic mythologies of India and Iran, and feature prominently in Vedic and post-Vedic Brahmanical mythology, as well as in the Buddhist tradition. In these traditions, asuras are often described as being engaged in interminable conflict with the devas (gods).
One of the three basic mental afflictions (together with aversion and confusion) within which all other mental afflictions can be subsumed. The term rāga comes from the root rañj, which can also have the sense of “to color,” thus making it possible to create significant double-meanings in Sanskrit (rakta can thus mean “impassioned,” but also “red” or “blood”). Liberated beings are often described as vītarāga, “free from attraction.”
The term jñāna is formed by the root jñā, meaning “to know,” “to know of,” “to understand,” “to be aware of,” with the addition of the pratyaya lyuṭ, which can be interpreted as having different values (the instrument of awareness, its agent, or the action of awareness). We have chosen “awareness” as it was the only that seemed to fit for two important (and not unrelated) contexts wherein jñāna is used: awareness of something, and nonobjective, nonconceptual awareness. In Tibetan the two senses are sometimes distinguished by using shes pa and ye shes, respectively, but the distinction in the usage of these two terms is not clearly marked in works that are translations from the Sanskrit, and hence it is less relevant for the Kangyur than it may be for indigenous Tibetan works. The nature of jñāna and its relationship with “wisdom” (prajñā) is the topic of one of the chapters of the Abhidharmakośa and is also thematized in a number of Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.
Epithet of a buddha; “one who has fortune” (explained as having six features) or “one who has vanquished (Māra).”
The term bhikṣu, which is often translated as “monk,” refers to the highest type among the eight types of prātimokṣa vows that make one part of the Buddhist assembly. The term is explained as having at least three possible meanings: (1) someone who begs; (2) someone who has taken the highest level of Buddhist ordination; and (3) someone who has destroyed mental afflictions.
Someone who practices according to the vehicle of the bodhisattvas, those who aim at complete buddhahood; the term is explained as “awakening hero,” “one who has a wish for awakening,” or also “one who awakens sentient beings.”
A high-ranking deity presiding over a divine world; he is also considered to be the lord of the Sahā world (our universe). Though not considered a creator god in Buddhism, Brahmā occupies an important place as one of two gods (the other being Indra/Śakra) said to have first exhorted the Buddha Śākyamuni to teach the Dharma. The particular heavens found in the form realm over which Brahmā rules are often some of the most sought-after realms of higher rebirth in Buddhist literature. Since there are many universes or world systems, there are also multiple Brahmās presiding over them. His most frequent epithets are “Lord of the Sahā World” (sahāṃpati) and Great Brahmā (mahābrahman).
Here the sense is “the supreme wheel” or perhaps “the wheel of what is supreme.” See brahmacakkaṃ pavattetīti ettha brahmanti seṭṭhaṃ uttamaṃ visiṭṭhaṃ | Mahāsīhanādasutta-Aṭṭhakathā, Mūlapaṇṇāsa, Majjhimanikāya.
Brahman is a Sanskrit term referring to what is highest (parama) and most important (pradhāna); the Nibandhana commentary explains brahman as meaning here nirvāṇa, and thus the brahman conduct is the “conduct toward brahman,” the conduct that leads to the highest liberation, i.e., nirvāṇa. This is explained as “the path without outflows,” which is the “truth of the path” among the four truths of the noble ones. Other explanations (found in the Pāli tradition) take “brahman conduct” to mean the “best conduct,” and also the “conduct of the best,” i.e., the buddhas. In some contexts, “brahman conduct” refers more specifically to celibacy, but the specific referents of this expression are many.
The translation is meant to somehow echo the etymology of prati + bhāna (“forth” + “shine”), and the term does mean something like “intelligence,” “inspiration,” or “eloquence,” often referring to the intelligent presence of mind that allows one to speak in the most appropriate way, even for very long stretches of time.
The term upādāna figures in at least two prominent contexts within basic Buddhist classifications. Firstly, the five aggregates are also called “aggregates of clinging” when they refer to a nonliberated person. According to the Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings, they are called “aggregates of clinging” for different reasons: they are “born from the clingings” because the aggregates arise due to the three mental afflictions of attraction, aversion, and confusion, which can also be called “clingings”; or, they are so called because the aggregates are under the control of the “clingings,” in the sense that it is due to the three mental afflictions that the aggregates remerge, after death, in a new realm of existence (Samtani 1971, pp. 87–88; the explanation in the Nibandhana partly follows Abhidharmakośabhāṣya on kārikā 1.8; see Pradhan 1967, p. 5).
Another important context of the term upādāna is as the ninth of the “twelve parts of dependent arising.” Here upādāna arises with craving (tṛṣṇā) as its condition. The difference between “craving” and “clinging” is explained by Vasubandhu as follows: it is “craving” when one strongly wants enjoyments but has not yet started searching for those objects of enjoyments (yāvan na tadviṣayaparyeṣṭim āpadyate); it is “clinging” once one starts seeking ways to obtain those objects of enjoyments and thus runs in all directions (viṣayaprāptaye paryeṣṭim āpannaḥ sarvato dhāvati). See Pradhan 1967, p. 132.
The term vijñāna is formed by the prefix vi plus a formation from the root jñā, which means “to know,” “to understand,” “to know of,” “to be aware of.” (This is reproduced in the Tibetan as rnam par + shes pa.) “Consciousness” has a specific meaning in Buddhist texts and refers to awareness of an object, point of reference, or support. This meaning is occasionally obtained by understanding the vi as standing for viṣaya, which means a domain of activity and, in this case, the object of perception. The standard list of consciousness types is six, corresponding to the five sense faculties plus the “thought consciousness.” This refers to a type of mental perception that arises taking as its basis not a sense faculty but a prior moment of consciousness itself; this type of consciousness is unrestricted as per its possible range of objects, both in terms of their location in time (past, present, or future) and in terms of their type (visual, audible, etc., including entities that are not within the range of any of the five senses).
This can mean either, more literally, “touch,” or coming into contact; in the context of the twelve parts of dependent arising, “contact” refers more specifically to the coming together of the object, faculty, and consciousness. According to some abhidharma masters, this coming together gives rise to a specific entity called “contact,” while others consider “contact” to simply describe a specific state of those three entities, i.e., when object, faculty, and consciousness are “together” and thus able to give rise to notion. It is also worth noticing that the root spṛś is used far more often in Sanskrit than either “to touch” or “to come in contact with” is used in English, and can often mean something like “to obtain” etc.
The highest level of the desire realm.
This refers to the habit of copulation, called a dharma perhaps as it is a property/feature that belongs to those who copulate, or in the sense of something that is one’s course of behavior.
The eighth of the twelve parts of dependent arising.
A class of deities, the first, i.e., lowest, in the form realm.
A mental factor understood either as “the coarseness of the mind” or as the cause for such coarseness. More elaborate definitions explain it as a type of “mental murmur” (manojalpa) that is searching (paryeṣaka) and can be either based on intention (cetanā) or on wisdom (prajñā). See also “analysis” (vicāra).
A key term for Buddhist philosophy that represents the basic Buddhist understanding of causal processes.
In pratītya-samutpāda, a compound of two terms, samutpāda means “arisin” or “coming into existence” and poses little interpretive difficulty. The preverb sam- is sometimes understood as meaning “together” (samavāyena), referring to the doctrine that no entity whatsoever arises on its own—ultimately existent bits of materiality always arise with other bits, and moments of mind are always accompanied by mental states. The sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti, however, clarifies that the Tibetan translation has ’brel par in the sense of “connection,” a rendering of sambandha resulting from an interpretation of the sam- as indicating connection (sam ni sambandha stes ’brel pa la bya).
The first part of the compound, pratītya, can be explained in two very different ways, which have occasioned lengthy debates at the crossroads of philosophy and grammar. According to one explanation, it would mean “things that are each bound to go, to vanish,” hence the whole expression would mean something like “the arising of things that are each bound to vanish,” i.e., the arising of impermanent things. This explanation is favored, for example, by Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti criticizes him for it (see Macdonald 2015, pp. 121–32). It is also the one opted for by Vīryaśrīdatta in the Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings (see Samtani 1971, p. 98).
The other interpretation takes pratītya as meaning “having obtained” or “having depended upon,” more flexibly also “depending,” i.e., without necessarily implying temporal succession of two activities by the same entity, which is problematic, as the entity cannot be easily expected to do something (even “depending”) before it has come into existence (unless one is a Vaibhāṣika who accepts existence of future entities). In this interpretation, the sense of the whole expression is expanded as “arising in dependence upon an assemblage of causes and conditions.” This interpretation seems to be prevalent, and hence it has been followed in the translation (it is also the basis for the Tibetan rendering as rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba). It has the distinct advantage of matching the only possible sense of pratītya when it appears outside of a compound in sūtra passages where the dependent arising of, say, eye consciousness is described. A long discussion of the proper sense and the two interpretations of the term pratītyasamutpāda can be found in chapter 3 of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 1967, p. 138).
We find numerous different explanations of dependent arising in the Buddhist texts, but three of them are most prominent: a short general definition of contingent coming into existence, as “A being there, B exists; from the arising of A, B arises”; the example of the arising of a single momentary entity, as “depending upon visible form and the eye faculty, eye consciousness arises”; and lastly the process of causality known as “dependent arising with twelve parts,” which describes the birth, complete life cycle, death, and rebirth of a sentient being in the desire realm (the part of the universe where we live and where several classes of sentient beings are born from a womb).
The twelve parts of dependent arising are often distributed into three lifetimes: ignorance and assembled factors belong to the previous lifetime; consciousness, name-and-form, the six entrances, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, and existence belong to the present lifetime; and birth and decay-and-death belong to the future lifetime (see Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 3.25, Pradhan 1967, pp. 133–34). This explanation allows one to make good sense of the frequent sequence, found in the sūtras, where first dependent arising is explained, and then it is said to vanquish all views regarding past, present, or future lives (this progression is also found in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; see Salvini 2011).
See “dependent arising.” These are the twelve causal links that perpetuate life in cyclic existence, starting with ignorance and ending with death.
Literally “born from Manu,” considered the first ancestor of all humans.
Among its many meanings, this term can refer to the teachings of the Buddha (when capitalized in this translation); positive actions that accord with it; an entity, which has (dhṛ) certain features through which it may be cognized (also the relevant sense in which it is used when dharmas are listed as the objects of thought); and a property or a quality (such as when discussing the Buddhadharmas, i.e., the dharmas of the Buddha, meaning his special qualities or properties).
The Nibandhana commentary explains the term arthaviniścaya twice. It first states, “ ‘Distinctly ascertaining the meanings’ means classifying/analyzing the dharmas” (arthānāṁ viniścayo dharmāṇāṁ pravicayaḥ, Samtani 1971, p. 73). This interpretation equates arthaviniścaya with the key term dharmapravicaya (“classifying the dharmas”), a synonym of “higher cognition” (prajñā), “special insight” (vipaśyanā), and, importantly, abhidharma.
The second explanation is slightly more elaborate: “For sentient beings, by listening to this, there is an ascertainment of the meaning/purpose in manifold ways; thus, this is a name wherein the meaning corresponds” (arthasya vividhākāreṇa niścayo bhavaty etat-śravaṇāt sattvānām ity anugatārthā saṁjñā, Samtani 1971, p. 83).
Samtani (1971, p. 57ff.) argues against taking the word artha to here signify “meaning(s),” and suggests instead that it should be understood as “topic,” “subject matter,” or “category”; thus, while Ferrari’s previous rendering would translate into English as “the determination of the meaning” (“la determinazione del significato,” Ferrari 1944, p. 588) and match our own preference, his own translation of arthaviniścaya is “compendium of categories” (Samtani 2002, p. 3). Bhikkhu Ānandajoti prefers “analysis of the topics” (Ānandajoti 2016, front cover), which also matches Norman’s preference (“analysis of the (Buddhist) topics,” Norman 1973, p. 677).
While we do not think that translating as either “category” or “topic” is, per se, wrong (for, one could say, the two senses of artha as “topic” and artha as “meaning” are somewhat overlapping), the arguments offered by Samtani do not entirely convince us. One of his arguments is that dharma = “category,” and therefore, since the commentary tells us that artha = dharma, it follows that artha is a category; here our difficulty is with the premise, since we believe that here dharma means “entity” rather “category,” and indeed dharmas as entities are meanings/referents as opposed to words (śabda). Another argument adduced by Samtani is based on his interpretation of a quote from Yaśomitra, where artha is equated with viṣaya, which in turn Samtani explains as “subject matter.” However, we think that the context of that passage (Wogihara 1989, p. 23) rather strongly suggests that it is not explaining the word artha as meaning “subject matter” but rather as “object,” i.e., viṣaya as “domain,” here in the sense of the domain of sensory activity of one of the five sense faculties. Yaśomitra is here explaining the term artha appearing in the expression “objects of the sense faculties” (indriyārthāḥ, Abhidharmakośakārikā 1.9).
Furthermore, we are not entirely sure that the sense of artha in the two explanations offered by the Nibandhana is exactly the same; we think that in the second explanation it is quite possible that artha (in the singular, unlike in the first interpretation) also, or maybe even primarily, carries the sense of “purpose” or “goal” (one could say “what is meaningful,” with a bit of a stretch). It is also quite likely that different nuances of the sense of artha are implied in the commentary, which is a virtue rather than a defect in Sanskrit writing (as we understand it).
We opted for “meaning” for the following reasons: it has a somewhat more vague/less specified feel (to us; “ascertaining the topics” could well mean ascertaining which topics are there (rather than, in fact, ascertaining their meanings); and, also taking into account other passages where the term arthaviniścaya occurs, we think it desirable to retain at least a suggestion of the opposition between “word” versus “meaning” (śabda vs. artha), which is of crucial importance in the Buddhist tradition (“relying on the meaning rather than on the words” is one of the four reliances (pratiśaraṇa); “relying on the topics” or “on the categories” may not sound too far from “relying on the words,” let alone be its opposite. Thus, “meaning/meaningful/purpose/what has purpose” is the range of meanings that we primarily read in the artha appearing in the expression arthaviniścaya.
The following passages use the term arthaviniścaya in contexts that are different from our sūtra, and thus we do not claim that any of them, or even all of them taken together, should lead to a conclusive ascertainment of the meaning of artha. However, we think they may clarify our purpose in using “meaning”:
“The awareness of all sounds of speech; the awareness of the etymological explanations; the awareness of the distinct ascertainment of the meaning/what is meaningful/what is of benefit; the avoidance of what is not of benefit/what is meaningless” (sarvarutajñānaṃ | niruktivyavasthānajñānaṃ | arthaviniścayajñānaṃ | anarthavivarjanaṁ, Samādhirājasūtra 37.27; Dutt 1941, p. 18).
“He sets aside the incoherent meaning/unconnected purpose; he is very certain in respect to the distinct ascertainment of the meanings/purposes” (asaṃsaktam artham uddharati suviniścito bhavati arthaviniścaye, Śayanāsanavastu, Gnoli 1978b, p. 45).
“This is a negation of the word-meaning; the real thing is not set aside. In this way, the distinct ascertainment of the meaning should also be understood in respect to other sentences” (śabdārthapratiṣedho 'yaṃ na vastu vinivāryate | evam anyeṣv api jñeyo vākyeṣv arthaviniścayaḥ, Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthaḥ of Dignāga, Tucci 1947, p. 58; Tucci here translates arthaviniścayaḥ as “determination of the things,” p. 65).
“What is the distinct ascertainment of the meaning? It is where there is a distinct ascertainment in respect to six meanings. Which six meanings? The meaning of own-being, the meaning of cause, the meaning of result, the meaning of karma, the meaning of yoga, and the meaning of occurrence” (arthaviniścayaḥ katamaḥ| yatra ṣaḍarthān ārabhya viniścayo bhavati || katame ṣaḍ arthāḥ | svabhāvārthaḥ hetvarthaḥ phalārthaḥ karmārthaḥ yogārthaḥ vṛttyarthaś ca, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Hayashima 2003, p. 858).
This refers stream enterers, once-returners, non-returners, and arhats, along with those practicing to attain the realizations of those states.
Eighteen collections of similar dharmas under which all coproduced and unproduced dharmas may be included: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and thought, plus their objects—visible forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles, and dharmas—plus the consciousnesses corresponding to each of the first six. The eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and thought are the basis for the arising of consciousness, though here there is the technical sense of a prior moment in any of the six consciousnesses. The first five consciousnesses depend on the five sense faculties as their basis, while the basis for the thought consciousness can be any of the six consciousnesses but not a sense faculty. Hence thought is classified among the dhātus (“elements”) in the section meant to offer a complete list of the possible bases of consciousness, i.e., what is most frequently listed as the second set of six elements.
The term dhātu is explained as having the sense of an ore (gotra), like a mineral ore, hence a point of origin (ākara). The bases are the points of origin for the arising of similar dharmas. The Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings explains that the order of enumeration of the eighteen bases can be explained in terms of the specific way in which different sense faculties operate within their domains or in terms of the placement (from higher to lower) of the eye faculty, the ear faculty, and so forth. The Abhidharmakośa explains that the teaching of the bases is for those who are of weaker abilities, since it is very detailed; it is for those who prefer special insight meditation (vipaśyanā), because it contains extensive analysis; and it counteracts a delusion of “self” that is evenly distributed between sentient and nonsentient elements, since the eighteen bases offer an analysis both of form and of mind and mental derivatives.
This refers to eighteen properties/qualities that are unique to buddhas, “property” being one of the possible meanings of the term dharma.
The set of eighty physical marks that identify both a buddha and a universal monarch (cakravartin); in the case of the former they indicate the perfection of the awakened state of buddhahood.
The list of dhātus in the sense of “elements” comprises the four great elements (see “great elements”) of earth, water, heat, and wind, plus space and consciousness, and is a list specifically designed to describe the assemblage of conditions that makes it possible for a new moment of consciousness to arise after the last moment of consciousness at death, i.e., it is meant to explain the process of rebirth.
The Nibandhana explains this as a metaphor of the eye and the feet, which, operating together, allow one to move; knowledge, interpreted as either “right view” or as “the training in wisdom,” is like the eye, while the other seven parts of the noble eightfold path, or the two other trainings in discipline and samādhi, function as the “feet.” This explanation is also found in the sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti, which further clarifies that zhabs is here simply the honorific term for “foot” (caraṇa ni rkang pa). Thus, although it is not uncommon to translate caraṇa here with “conduct,” this loses the significance of the metaphor.
The Nibandhana explains this as “the fatigue that is preceded by grief and lamentation” (śokaparidevapūrvakaśramaḥ, Samtani 1971, p. 102).
The first level of realization that transforms an ordinary person into a “noble one,” someone who has directly seen the nature of reality and has a sufficiently stable level of realization to be already bound toward liberation from saṃsāra.
The tenth of the twelve parts of dependent arising.
The lowest of the three planes of existence, where coarse desires for all the sense objects are present.
The middling type among the three planes of existence, where desire for coarse food or copulation is absent.
The Nibandhana explains that this refers to a standard list of eight assembled factors: zest (chanda), effort (vyāyāma), faith (śraddhā), mindfulness (smṛti), discerning awareness (saṁprajanya), intention (cetanā), and equanimity (upekṣā) (Samtani 1971, p. 221).
“Faculties” is a translation meant to represent the preferred etymologization of indriya in Buddhist texts as indanti, meaning “they have power,” which is also reflected in the Tibetan translation as dbang po. Different lists of indriyas exist within the Buddhist texts, their common trait being that they have “power” over a specific domain of activity. For example, the five sense faculties have causal power with respect to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching.
Here “faith” is not used so much in the sense of “religious faith,” but rather as when one says, “I have faith in you” or “I have faith in your good qualities.” It is often explained as “a good disposition of the mind” (cetasaḥ prasādaḥ) toward something and is occasionally divided into three types: faith as the conviction that something exists, faith as the conviction that something has good qualities, and faith as the conviction that something with good qualities can be obtained.
The second of the five aggregates and the seventh of the twelve parts of dependent arising.
Five collections of similar dharmas under which all dependently arisen dharmas may be included: form (materiality), feeling, notion, assembled factors, and consciousness.
The five aggregates of form, feeling, notion, assembled factors, and consciousness. They are referred to as the bases for clinging insofar as all conceptual grasping arises based on these aggregates.
The faculties of faith, heroism, mindfulness, samādhi, and wisdom. They are the same as the five strengths, only at a lesser stage of development.
The strengths of faith, heroism, mindfulness, samādhi, and wisdom. They are the same as the five faculties, only at a greater stage of development.
don rnam par nges pa zhes bya ba’i chos kyi rnam grangs (Arthaviniścayanāmadharmaparyāya). Toh 317, Degé Kangyur vol. 72 (mdo sde, sa), folios 170.b–188.a.
don rnam par nges pa zhes bya ba’i chos kyi rnam grangs (Arthaviniścayanāmadharmaparyāya). Stok no. 70, Stok Palace Kangyur vol. 58 (mdo sde, ja), folios 405.a–428.a.
don rnam par nges pa zhes bya ba’i chos kyi rnam grangs. bka’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) [Comparative Edition of the Kangyur], krung go’i bod rig pa zhib ’jug ste gnas kyi bka’ bstan dpe sdur khang (The Tibetan Tripitaka Collation Bureau of the China Tibetology Research Center). 108 volumes. Beijing: krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang (China Tibetology Publishing House), 2006–2009, vol. 72, pp. 490–534.
don rnam par gdon mi za ba’i ’grel pa (Arthaviniścayaṭīkā). Toh 4365, Degé Tengyur vol. 207 (sna tshogs, nyo), folios 1.b–192.a.
dge ’dun gyi dbyen gyi gzhi (Saṅghabhedavastu). Toh 1, ch. 17. Degé Kangyur vol. 3 (’dul ba, ga), folios 255.b–293.a; vol. 4 (’dul ba, nga), folios 1.b–302.a.
’phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcod pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Āryavajracchedikānāmaprajñāpāramitāmahāyānasūtra). Toh 16, Degé Kangyur vol. 34 (shes rab sna tshogs, ka), folios 121.a–132.b.
’phags pa ’od srungs kyi le’u zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Āryakāśyapaparivartanāmamahāyānasūtra). Toh 87, Degé Kangyur vol. 44 (dkon brtsegs, cha), folios 199.b–151.b.
ched du brjod pa’i tshoms (Udānavarga). Toh 326, Degé Kangyur vol. 72 (mdo sde, sa), folios 209.a–253.a.
kye’i rdo rje zhes bya ba rgyud kyi rgyal po (Hevajratantrarājanāma). Toh 417, Degé Kangyur vol. 80 (rgyud, nga), folios 1.b–13.b.
’phags pa ’jam dpal gyi rtsa ba’i rgyud (Āryamañjuśrīmūlakalpa). Toh 543, Degé Kangyur vol. 88 (rgyud, na), folios 105.a–351.a. English translation in Dharmachakra Translation Committee 2020.
Āryaśūra. pha rol tu phyin pa bsdus pa (Pāramitāsamāsa). Toh 3944, Degé Tengyur vol. 111 (dbu ma, khi), folios 217.b–235.a.
Asaṅga. chos mngon pa kun las btus pa (Abhidharmasamuccaya). Toh 4049, Degé Tengyur vol. 134 (sems tsam, ri), folios 1.b–120.b.
Candrakīrti. gsum la skyabs su ’gro ba bdun cu pa (Triśaraṇagamanasaptati). Toh 3971, Degé Tengyur vol. 112 (dbu ma, gi), folios 251.a–253.b; Toh 4564, Degé Tengyur vol. 213 (jo bo’i chos chung), folios 202.a–204.b.
Dignāga. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin ma bsdus pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa (Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṃgrahakārikā). Toh 3809, Degé Tengyur vol. 93 (shes phyin, pha), folios 292.b–294.b.
Dignāga. tshad ma kun las btus pa (Pramāṇasamuccaya). Toh 4203, Degé Tengyur vol. 174 (tshad ma, ce), folios 1.b–13.a.
Haribhadra. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa’i bshad pa mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi snang ba (Āryāṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāvyākhyābhisamayālaṃkarālokā). Toh 3791, Degé Tengyur vol. 85 (shes phyin, cha), folios 1.b–341.a.
Haribhadra. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan zhes bya ba’i ’grel pa (Abhisamayālaṃkāranāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛtti). Toh 3793, Degé Tengyur vol. 86 (shes phyin, ja), folios 78.b–140.a.
Nagārjuna. dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab (Prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā). Toh 3824, Degé Tengyur vol. 96 (dbu ma, tsa), folios 1.b–19.a.
Prajñākaramati. byang chub kyi spyod pa la ’jug pa’i dka’ ’grel (Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā). Toh 3872, Degé Tengyur vol. 105 (dbu ma, la), folios 41.b–288.a.
Sthiramati. sum cu pa’i bshad pa (Triṃśikābhāṣya). Toh 4064, Degé Tengyur vol. 136 (sems tsam, shi), folios 146.b–171.b.
Subhūticandra. ’chi ba med pa’i mdzod kyi rgya cher ’grel pa ’dod ’jo’i ba mo (Amarakoṣaṭīkākāmadhenu). Toh 4300, Degé Tengyur vol. 197 (sgra mdo, se), folios 244.b–318.a.
Ratnākaraśānti. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa’i dka’ ’grel snying po mchog (Āryāṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāpañjikāsārottamā). Toh 3803, Degé Tengyur vol. 89 (shes phyin, tha), folios 1.b–230.a.
Vasubandhu. chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi tshig le’ur byas pa (Abhidharmakośakārikā). Toh 4089, Degé Tengyur vol. 140 (mngon pa, ku), folios 1.b–25.a.
Vilāsavajra. ’phags pa mtshan yang dag par brjod pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa mtshan gsang sngags kyi don du rnam par lta ba (Āryanāmasaṃgītiṭīkānāmamantrārthāvalokinī). Toh 2533, Degé Tengyur vol. 63 (rgyud, khu), folios 27.b–115.b.
Vilāsavajra. chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi bshad pa (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya). Toh 4090, Degé Tengyur vol. 140 (mngon pa, ku), folios 26.a–258.a; vol. 141 (mngon pa, khu), folios 1.b–95.a.
Yaśomitra. chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi ’grel bshad (Abhidharmakośaṭīkā). Toh 4092, Degé Tengyur vol. 142 (mngon pa, gu), folios 1.b–330.a; vol. 143 (mngon pa, ngu), folios 1.b–333.a.
bye brag tu rtogs par byed pa chen po (Mahāvyutpatti). Toh 4346, Degé Tengyur vol. 204 (sna tshogs, co), folios 1.b–131.a.
All Pāli references are from Chaṭṭa Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka 4.0, version 4.0.0.15. Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute, 1995.
Amano, Hirofusa, ed. A Study on the Abhisamaya-alaṁkāra-kārikā-śāstra-vṛtti. Tokyo: Japan Science Press, 1975.
Ānandajoti, Bhikkhu, trans. “Artha-Viniścaya-Sūtram: The Discourse giving the Analysis of the Topics.” Ancient Buddhist Texts. Last updated November 2016.
Bernhard, Franz, ed. Udānavarga. Vol. 1, Einleitung, Beschreibung der Handschriften, Textausgabe, Bibliographie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965.
Buescher, Hartmut, ed. Sthiramati’s Triṁśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenachaften, 2007.
Dādhimatha, Śivadatta, ed. Nāmaliṅgāniṡāsana Alias Amarakoṣa with the Commentary Vyākhyāsudhā or Rāmāśramī of Bhānuji Dīkṣita. Delhi: Chaukhambha, 1995.
De Jong, J. W. Review of The Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana), by N. H. Samtani. Indo-Iranian Journal 17, no. 1/2 (April/May 1975): 115–18.
La Vallée Poussin, Louis de, ed. Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā: Prajñākaramati’s Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Çāntideva, Edited with Indices. Bibliotheca Indica 983, 1031, 1090, 1126, 1139, 1305 and 1399. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1901–14.
Deokar, Lata Mahesh, ed. Subhūticandra’s Kavikāmadhenu on Amarakośa 1.1.1-1.4.8: Together with Si tu Paṇ chen’s Tibetan translation. Indica et Tibetica 55. Marburg: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 2014.
Dharmachakra Translation Committee, trans. The Root Manual of the Rites of Mañjuśrī (Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, Toh 543). 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha, 2020.
Dietz, Siglinde, and Champa Thupten Zongtse, eds. Udānavarga. Vol. 3, Der tibetische Text. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
Dutt, Nalinaksha, and Vidyavaridhi Shiv Nath Sharma, eds. Gilgit Manuscripts Vol. II. Srinagar: Calcutta Oriental Press, 1941.
Edgerton, Franklin. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Vol. 2, Dictionary. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.
Ferrari, Alfonsa, ed. (1944). “Arthaviniścaya.” Atti della Reale Accademia d’Italia: Memorie della Classe di Scienze morali e storiche series 7, vol. 4, fasc. 13 (1944): 535–625.
Ferrari, Alfonsa, ed. (1946). “Il ‘compendio delle Perfezioni’ di Āryaśūra.” Annali Lateranensi 10 (1946): 9–102.
Gnoli, Raniero, and T. Venkatacharya, eds. (1978a). The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu. Vol. 2. Serie Orientale Roma 49.2. Rome: Instituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1978.
Gnoli, Raniero, and T. Venkatacharya, eds. (1978b). The Gilgit Manuscript of the Śayanāsanavastu and the Adhikaraṇavastu, Being of the 15th and 16th Sections of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin. Serie Orientale Roma 50. Rome: Instituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1978.
Hayashima, Osamu. E-text Abhidharmasamuccaya and Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya. Vol. 3. Shiga: Private Issue, 2003.
Jaini, Padmanabh, ed. Sāratamā: A Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra by Ācārya Ratnākaraśānti. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 18. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1979.
Kedārnāth, P., ed. The Nāṭyaśāstra by Śrī Bharatamuni. Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar, 1943.
Kern, Hendrik, ed. The Jātaka-māla or Bodhisattvāvadāna-mālā by Ārya-çūra. Boston: Harvard University, 1891.
Lee, Jong Cheol, ed. The Tibetan Text of the Vyākhyāyukti of Vasubandhu: Critically Edited from the Cone, Derge, Narthang and Peking Editions. Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica 8. Tokyo: Sankibo, 2001.
MacDonald, Anne, ed. and trans. In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One. 2 vols. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2015.
“Mahāvyutpatti with sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa.” Bibliotheca Polyglotta, University of Oslo. Accessed May 2020.
Minaev, I. P. “Spasenie po učeniju pozdnějšich buddistov.” In Zapiski Vostočnago Otdelenija Russkago Archeologičeskago Obščestva 4 (1889): 153‒228.
Müller, F. Max, and H. Wenzel, eds. Buddhist Technical Terms: An Ancient Buddhist Text Ascribed to Nāgārjuna. 1885. Reprinted with annotations by Kenjiu Kasawara, Delhi: Orient Publications, 1984.
Nance, Richard F. Speaking for Buddhas: Scriptural Commentary in Indian Buddhism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
Negi, J. S. Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary (bod skad dang legs sbyar gyi tshig mdzod chen mo). 16 vols. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1993–2005.
Norman, K. R. Review of The Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana) (Written by Bhikṣu Vīryaśrīdatta of Śrī-Nālandāvihāra), by N. H. Samtani. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 36, no. 3 (1973): 677–78.
Paṇśikar, W. L. Shāstrī, ed. Śrīmadbhagavadgītā. Mumbai: Nirṇaya Sāgara, 1936.
Pradhan, Prahlad, ed. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
Salvini, Mattia. “The Nidānasamyukta and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: Understanding the Middle Way through Comparison and Exegesis.” Thai International Journal of Buddhist Studies 2 (2011): 57–95.
Samtani, N. H., ed. (1971). The “Arthaviniścayasūtra” and Its Commentary (“Nibandhana”). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.
Samtani, N. H., trans. (2002). Gathering the Meanings: The Compendium of Categories: The Arthaviniścaya Sūtra and Its Commentary Nibandhana. Tibetan Translation Series. Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 2002.
Śāstrī, T. Gaṇapati, ed. Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa. Vol. 1. Trivandrum: Government Press, 1920.
Skilling, Peter (2000). “Vasubandhu and the Vyākhyāyukti Literature.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 23, no. 2 (2000): 297–350.
Skilling, Peter (2012). “Discourse on the Twenty-Two Faculties (Translated from Śamathadeva’s Upāyikā-ṭīkā).” In Dharmapravicaya: Aspects of Buddhist Studies: Essays in Honour of N. H. Samtani, edited by Lalji “Shravak” and Charles Willemen Delhi: Buddhist World Press, 2012.
Steinkellner, Ernst, ed. “Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1.” Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Online publication April 2005.
Tribe, Anthony. Tantric Buddhist Practice in India: Vilāsavajra’s Commentary on the Mañjuśrī-nāmasaṃgīti. Routledge Studies in Tantric Traditions. London: Routledge, 2016.
Tripāṭhī, Rāmaśaṅkara, and Thakur Sain Negi, eds. Hevajratantram with Muktāvalī Pañjikā of Mahāpaṇḍitācārya Ratnākaraśānti. Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series 48. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 2001.
Tucci, Giuseppe. “Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñâ-pâramitâ: 1. The Prajñâ-pâramitâ-piṇḍârtha of Diṅnâga.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1 (1947): 53–75.
Vaidya, P. L., ed. Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṁgraha: Part I. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961.
Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, M. I., Seishi Karashima, and Noriyuki Kudo, ed. The Kāśyapaparivarta: Romanized Text and Facsimiles. Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica 5. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, 2002.
Wogihara, Unrai, ed. Abhisamayālaṁkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā: The Work of Haribhadra. 2 vols. Tokyo: Sankibo, 1932–73.
Wogihara, Unrai, ed. Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā. Tokyo: Sankibo, 1936, 1971, 1989.